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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Case No. 20040880-SC
vs.
RICHARD NORRIS,
Defendant/Petitioner.

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER AND BRIEF OF CROSS-RESPONDENT

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State concedes that Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801, the communications
fraud statute, imposes criminal liability for harmless conduct and thereby provides
virtually unlimited prosecutorial discretion. The State further argues that the object of the
"fraud'' is irrelevant so long as a falsehood is made with knowingly, intentionally, or with
a reckless disregard for the truth.
However, harmless conduct is protected under the First Amendment. The mens
rea element relied upon by the State is applicable to defamatory falsehoods. Defamation
is conduct injurious to reputation and is, therefore, harmful. In contrast, all falsehoods
are not harmful, and therefore, may not all be proscribed simply because they are made
with at least a reckless disregard for the truth. Moreover, although some falsehoods are
protected in order to protect speech that matters; §76-10-1801 proscribes all falsehoods.

All content-based regulations, such as §76-10-1801, must take into account what
is said as well as the circumstances in which it is said, which the communications fraud
statute fails to do. In other words, harmless speech is protected under the First
Amendment. Because the communications fraud statute requires no imminent harm or
danger to impose criminal liability and indiscriminately prohibits both protected and
unprotected conduct, the statute violates the First Amendment and is facially overbroad.
In short, the statute is not narrowly drawn to further a compelling state interest.
Further, the State has failed to address the case law cited in Mr. Norris' opening
brief holding criminal content-based regulations to a different standard than that which
applies to defamation. The State has also not addressed the fact that the communications
fraud statute has no precedent in the common law or in other jurisdictions, as outlined in
detail in Mr. Norris' opening brief, or the fact that in each and eveiy case, analogous
statutes require proof of harm or intent to defraud of some measurable value.
The State's argument that Mr. Norris has no standing to argue facial overbreadth
is not preserved and is without merit. Under applicable precedent, Mr. Norris has
standing to mount a facial overbreadth challenge, whether the communications at issue in
this case are or are not protected under the First Amendment. His course of conduct was
affected with a constitutional interest, proscribed by statute such thai there existed a threat
of prosecution, and he clearly has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.
Finally, a challenge that a statute is facially overbroad encompasses the void for

2

vagueness doctrine. Both doctrines are ultimately concerned with preventing unfettered
prosecutorial discretion and leaving matters of basic policy in the hands of law
enforcement and others. As such, both doctrines are logically related and similar.
Therefore, Mr. Norris assumed that this Court's grant of certiorari on the issue of
overbreadth included the void for vagueness doctrine.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE BROAD LANGUAGE OF §76-10-1801 PROHIBITS
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITY, IS NOT READILY
SUBJECT TO A NARROWING CONSTRUCTION, AND IS THUS
FACIALLY INVALID.
A.

THE STATE'S RELIANCE ON MENS REA IS MISPLACED, AS
§76-10-1801 IS A CONTENT-BASED REGULATION THAT
PROSCRIBES COMMUNICATION IRRESPECTIVE OF
WHETHER THERE IS ANY THREAT OF IMMINENT HARM,
AND THEREBY VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT.
1.

The State concedes §76-10-1801 proscribes harmless conduct.

While conceding that Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 allows the State broad
discretion to prosecute even harmless conduct, the State attempts to justify this anomaly
by urging the Court to adopt the novel position that the government can impose criminal
liability for any falsehoods made knowingly, intentionally, or with a reckless disregard for
the truth. BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS-PETITIONER ("Br. Rspdt") at 9-13. "But
the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done." Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).

3

2.

Harmless conduct is protected under the First Amendment

Therefore, the State's argument is not correct. Even under the law relied upon
by the State, a defamatory or libelous falsehood made with '"actual malice"' falls outside
the protective scope of the First Amendment, not simply because it is false, but because it
is harmful. New York Times v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). "Speech is often
provocative and challenging. . . . [But it] is nevertheless protected against censorship or
punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious
substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest."
Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4
(1949).
Defamation is a harm that the government has a limited power to prevent and
prosecute. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). "[So] long as [states] do
not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate
standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a
private individual." Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 499 (1975) (citation
and quotation omitted) (emphasis added). In the context of a facial overbreadth
challenge, the possibility that "some unprotected speech may go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted . . . " Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., All U.S. 50, 60 (1976).

4

3.

§76-10-1801 proscribes harmless conduct

The communications fraud statute imposes liability without fault, because it does
not require harm or injury, as the State concedes. Br. Rspdt at 13. Thus, the statute
prohibits both protected and unprotected speech.1 In every case where courts have
determined that a certain type of speech is not protected by the First Amendment, the
ability of government to regulate content-based communication is still limited not by
mens rea, but by the necessity of proving a cognizable harm that may result from its
publication. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd, 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (holding that although the government has a compelling interest
in ensuring criminals do not profit from their crimes, New York's "'Son of Sam" law was
not narrowly tailored to achieve that end).2 This is true because historically, courts have
exercised great caution in balancing purportedly compelling government interests against

'"The question of whether speech is, or is not, protected by the First Amendment
often depends on the content of the speech. Thus, the line between permissible advocacy
and impermissible incitation to crime or violence depends, not merely on the setting in
which the speech occurs, but also on exactly what the speaker had to say." Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., Ml U.S. at 66.
2

"As a means of ensuring that victims are compensated from the proceeds of crime,
the Son of Sam law is significantly overinclusive. As counsel for the Board conceded at
oral argument, the statute applies to works on any subject, provided that they express the
author's thoughts or recollections about his crime, however tangentially or incidentally.
In addition, the statute's broad definition of "person convicted of a crime" enables the
Board to escrow the income of any author who admits in his work to having committed a
crime, whether or not the author was ever actually accused or convicted." Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. at 121 (citations
omitted).
5

First Amendment rights relative to any content-based regulation of speech, which is the
precise type of regulation the communications fraud statute is:
w

There are a few legal categories in which content-based regulation has been
permitted or at least contemplated. These include obscenity, see, e. g., Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973), defamation,
see, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., Ml U.S. 749, 86
L. Ed. 2d 593, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985), incitement, see, e.g., Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430, 89 S. Ct. 1827 (1969), or situations
presenting some grave and imminent danger the government has the power to
prevent, see, e.g., Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716, 75 L. Ed.
1357,51 S.Ct. 625 (1931)."
Id. at 127 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Harmless conduct is protected under the First
Amendment because the government has no interest, compelling or otherwise, to prevent
it; and as noted above, the possible harm that may result from some unprotected speech
going unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech will be muted.
4.

A content-based regulation, such as §76-10-1801, must be
narrowly drawn to prevent some harm that the government
has the power to prevent

Therefore, whether the government seeks to regulate defamatory speech,
obscenity, or speech posing some grave and imminent danger, in each case the
government must first demonstrate a compelling interest in preventing a specific type of
harm. Accordingly and contrary to the State's arguments, it is inappropriate to apply a
civil or criminal defamation standard to a criminal statute that is not aimed at proscribing
harmful defamatory speech, which further explains why there is no legal precedent to
support such a misapplication of the law.

6

As the United States Supreme Court further instructed, "The immediacy of a
particular communication and the imminence of harm are factors that have made certain
communications less protected than others. Compare Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971), with Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); see Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)/' Ohralikv.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978) (emphasis added). As an initial matter
and contrary to the State's interpretation of existing law, Ohralik illustrates that the First
Amendment principles articulated in Schenck v. United States are not only still viable, but
they form a strong foundation for First Amendment jurisprudence upon which later
decisions are and will continue to be built.
But even more compelling is the universal requirement that the government
justify any content-based regulation by demonstrating the reality of some harm it has the
power to prevent, or in other words, a compelling interest. Id. Yet §76-10-1801 deviates
from the principles governing First Amendment jurisprudence in that it imposes criminal
liability regardless of whether the conduct proscribed may result in any harm, imminent or
otherwise. The State acknowledges this fact, but asserts that as long as a false
communication is made with the requisite intent, the object of the deceit and the admitted
absence of harm is irrelevant. Br. Rspdt. at 13. The State's position is wrong, as the law
cited herein demonstrates. Further, the State can demonstrate no compelling interest in
preventing and prosecuting harmless falsehoods.

7

5.

§76-10-1801 is not narrowly drawn to further a compelling
government interest

Moreover, Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 is nox narrowly aimed at proscribing
obscenity, defamation, incitement, or even situations involving grave and imminent
danger, although the statute is so broad, all such categories of speech could conceivably
be suppressed in certain instances by its far-reaching terms. However, the
communications fraud statute applies directly to none of these judicially established
categories of content-based regulation.
It is also apparent from the statutory language that the legislature was not
seeking to proscribe obscenity, incitement, or even defamation, by enactment of the
communications fraud statute. The closest application to a judicially established
constitutional standard for a content-based regulation is the category of unprotected
speech that involves grave and imminent danger. However, §76-10-1801 substantially
overreaches even here in that it is not necessary to prove any danger - grave or imminent
- for criminal liability to be imposed. Hence, the unconstitutional overbreadth of the
statute is manifest, and the State acknowledges and even embraces this legislative grant of
unlimited prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., Br. Rspdt at 13.
Therefore, State's sole reliance upon the defamation element of mens rea
(knowing, intentional, or reckless disregard for the truth), skews its analysis such that its
conclusions are contrary to the fundamental First Amendment principles that must be
protected in any content-based regulation.
8

When any statute proscribes communication based on content, as §76-10-1801
does, a court must first determine whether it falls under a category of speech recognized
as unprotected by established First Amendment jurisprudence, such as obscenity, child
pornography, libel, incitement to riot, or grave and imminent danger. If it does, then a
court must determine whether the statute in question is sufficiently narrow to promote a
compelling government interest without infringing upon protected speech.
The First Amendment presupposes that the freedom to speak one's mind is not
only an aspect of individual liberty — and thus a good unto itself — but also is
essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.
Under our Constitution "there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas." [citing
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-340]. Nevertheless, there are
categories of communication and certain special utterances to which the majestic
protection of the First Amendment does not extend because they "are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." [citing Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. at 572 (1942)].
Libelous speech has been held to constitute one such category, see Beauharnais
v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); others that have been held to be outside the
scope of the freedom of speech are fighting words, Chaplinslvy v. New
Hampshire, supra, incitement to riot, [citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969)], obscenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), and child
pornography, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). In each of these areas,
the limits of the unprotected category, as well as the unprotected character of
particular communications, have been determined by the judicial evaluation of
special facts that have been deemed to have constitutional significance. In such
cases, the Court has regularly conducted an independent review of the record
both to be sure that the speech in question actually falls within the unprotected
category and to confine the perimeters of any unprotected category within
acceptably narrow limits in an effort to ensure that protected expression will not
be inhibited. . . . The principle of viewpoint neutrality that underlies the First
9

Amendment itself, see Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
95-96 (1972), also imposes a special responsibility on judges whenever it is
claimed that a particular communication is unprotected. See generally
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 503-505 (1984) (emphasis added). It is
important to follow this narrowly prescribed course of constitutional review and to look
to established precedent because, as the law cited above illustrates, what constitutes
"unprotected speech" under the First Amendment represents the exception rather than the
rule. Thus, the initial query should not be what is protected, but what is not.
In answer to this initial question, there is no precedent supporting the State's
conclusion that all falsehoods made with at least a reckless disregard for the truth are noi
protected. In fact, although a false statement may have little if any social value, some
falsehoods, as well as other communications also arguably having little if any social value
(i.e. pornography, inane television programs, "'small talk," etc.), are protected in order to
protect speech that matters. Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc., 418 U.S. at 341-42. Moreover,
the State can demonstrate no compelling interest in proscribing all falsehoods made with
the requisite intent.
Nonetheless, the communications fraud statute breaches the slippery slope of
endangering speech that matters because, as the State concedes, it prohibits all falsehoods
made with the requisite intent, regardless of harm. In other words, it is a content-based
regulation that is not narrowly draw to further a compelling government interest.
Notwithstanding the fact that §76-10-1801 is not readily subject to a narrowing
10

construction, it is simply not prudent to enact a blanket ban on all at least recklessly made
falsehoods. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the Court observed:
Every communication has an individuality and "value" of its own. The
suppression of a particular writing or other tangible form of expression is,
therefore, an individual matter, and in the nature of things every such
suppression raises an individual constitutional problem, in which a reviewing
court must determine for itself whether the attacked expression is [suppressive]
within constitutional standards. Since those standards do not readily lend
themselves to generalized definitions, the constitutional problem in the last
analysis becomes one of particularized judgments which appellate courts must
make for themselves.
Id. at 497-498. Thus, a statute that casts a net large enough to criminalize both harmless
and harmful speech, such as §76-10-1801 does, is not only unwise, it is unconstitutional
because it is not narrowly drawn to further a compelling government interest.
The fact that the State does not deny that §76-10-1801 proscribes even harmless
falsehoods is problematic for the State. Br. Rspdt. at 13 ("It is therefore irrelevant how
the statute limits the object of the fraud. Whether or not the object of the fraud is a kiss, a
vote, avoiding arrest, or some other thing of arguable value is irrelevant because, in any
case, the intentional, knowing, or reckless falsehood is not protected."). Indeed, the
State's arguments manifest a clear understanding that the broad statutory language
reaches just as broadly as the imagination - and as prosecutorial discretion - permits. Id.
The State does not address this problem, or the fact that the statute leaves matters of basic
policy indiscriminately to the subjective discretion of prosecutors, judges, juries, and
policemen. Graynedv. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,108-9(1972).
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Rather, the State simply argues that falsehoods made knowingly, intentionally,
or with a reckless disregard for the truth are not protected, while acknowledging United
States Supreme Court precedent holding that the First Amendment must protect some
falsehoods in order to protect speech that matters. Id (Citing Gertz v. Robert Welsh,
Inc., 418 U.S. at 341-42). However, as demonstrated above, the fact that defamatory
falsehoods made knowingly, intentionally, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, are
not protected {see, New York Times v Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)), does not justify the
State's conclusion that all non-defamatory falsehoods made with a similar intent may be
proscribed without offending the First Amendment.
The State also ignores the restrictions articulated by the United States Supreme
Court and set forth throughout Mr. Norris' opening brief relative to criminal statutes
regulating communications.3 The also does not address the voluminous legal precedent
developed over decades which holds criminal content-based regulations to a different
standard than that which applies to actions for defamation. Nor does the State address the
fact, outlined in detail in Mr. Norris5 opening brief, that §76-10-1801 deviates

"See, e.g., BRIEF OF APPELLANT, at 17: "See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844
(1997) ("The increased deterrent effect of a vague criminal provision, coupled with the
risk of discriminatory enforcement, poses greater concerns with respect to the freedom of
speech protected by the Federal Constitution's First Amendment 1han those implicated by
a civil regulation.");" BRIEF OF APPELLANT at 21: 'See also, Smith v United States, 431
U.S. 291, 318 n.l6 (1977) (explaining that a criminal statute may not proscribe all
potentially dangerous speech, without taking into account content ("Fire!") and place (a
crowded theater) (citing and quoting Schenck))"
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significantly from the common law and analogous statutes from other jurisdictions,
particularly in that it proscribes harmless conduct.
The broad language of Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801, in harmony with the
State's justifiably broad interpretation of it, imposes strict liability for any - at least
recklessly made - false factual assertion. This is manifest in the fact that there need be no
reliance, harm, or intent to defraud. This imposition of strict liability is more than merely
problematic. It flies in the face of existing law. See, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (explaining that there is no strict liability for false factual assertions by
a publisher because the contrary ''would have an undoubted 'chilling' effect on speech
relating to public figures that does have constitutional value"; therefore, '"freedoms of
expression require "breathing space'"" (quoting Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,
475 U.S. 767, 772 (1985))).
The communications fraud statute is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face
because it proscribes a substantial amount of protected speech, including harmless
communications. Although the government has a compelling interest in preventing and
prosecuting certain kinds of fraud, the statute is not narrowly drawn to achieve that end.
And although §76-10-1801 could be construed in certain circumstances to prohibit speech
that may involve grave and imminent danger, it just as readily applies to harmless
communications posing no fraud or danger of any kind. Accordingly, the statute is
facially invalid for overbreadth.
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B.

THE STATE FAILED TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE OF
STANDING, AND IN ANY EVENT, MR. NORRIS HAS
STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE FACIAL OVERBREADTH
OF THE STATUTE.

The State argues that Mr. Norris does not have standing to challenge the
overbreadth of the communications fraud statute, citing this Court's decision in Provo
City Corporation v. Thompson, 86 P.3d 735 (Utah 2004). As an initial matter, the State is
precluded from raising this issue as it exceeds the scope of certiorari. DeBry v. Noble,
889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995). This Court cannot review a question that was never raised and
therefore never addressed by the Utah Court of Appeals, as such would clearly exceed the
scope of certiorari. See, State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (1995) (explaining that on
a grant of certiorari, this Court reviews only the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals).
Further, because the State has never alleged that Mr. Norris lacked standing to challenge
the constitutionality of the statute, this issue is not preserved and is not properly before
this Court. Therefore, this Court should refuse to address it. Smith v. Four Corners
Mental Health Ctr., 70 P.3d 904 (Utah 2003).
Even if the State could raise the issue of standing at this juncture, the State's
argument is flawed in a number of respects. First, the Information by which Mr. Norris
was charged expressly used the term, ''anything of value," as well as money. See, R8;
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, Addendum A. Using broad language identical to the statute, Mr.
Norris was charged with devising a "scheme or artifice to defraud subcontractors and
others doing business with Bryce Nelson Construction or with its subcontractors, or to
14

obtain from them, money, property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and [with communicating]
directly or indirectly with [the subcontractors], by any means for the purpose of executing
or concealing the scheme or artifice. The total value of the property, money, or thing
obtained or sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice was or exceeded $5,000.00."
As also noted in his opening brief, because of the broad and vague language used in the
charging document, which was based on the statute, Mr. Norris requested a bill of
particulars which was denied (R182; 430).
Second, Mr. Norris' position is and has consistently been that, not just the
"anything of value" language, but the entire statute is unconstitutionally overbroad; and
this Court cannot rewrite it to conform to constitutional standards. (" . . . the statute's
unconstitutionality runs throughout its entire context, and cannot be remedied short of
rewriting the entire provision." Id. at 19; ". . . §76-10-1801 casts such a large net for all
possible offenders, regardless of intent, content, or place of proscribed speech, that it is
effectively 'burning the house to roast the pig.'" (citation omitted); Id at 22; "The
communications fraud statute, by its broad terms, is not narrowly tailored to achieve a
legitimate government interest."). Id.
Mr. Norris further highlights the broad language regarding the limitless
possibilities for the object of the fraud (which the State concedes tol the lack of any
requirement for reliance, the fact that the perpetrator need have no intent to permanently
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deprive the owner of die object of the scheme or artifice to obtain anything of value, the
confusing language of subsection 5 that makes each communication a separate offense in
conjunction with subsections (1) a-e, and the broad definition of "communicate." Id. at
23-24. All of these problems aside, the State simply misinterprets Thompson as it applies
to the issue of standing here.
The reason for the exception to traditional standing requirements in a facial
overbreadth challenge "rests on the very real possibility that an overbroad statute will
cause injury not only when applied to punish protected speech, but also in its 'chilling
affect' on protected activity." Provo City Corporation v. Thompson, 86 P.3 at 739. Thus,
even if Mr. Norris5 own conduct is not protected under the First Amendment, he has
standing to challenge the statute if his alleged course of conduct was "arguably affected
with a constitutional interest, proscribed by statute, and there exists a credible threat of
prosecution." Id. Mr. Norris also must demonstrate that his harm will be redressed if the
statute is invalidated. Id.
The State misconstrues the law relative to the issue of standing and misinterprets
Thompson. From the outset, a facial overbreadth challenge presents an exception to
traditional standing requirements. Id. at 738. Further, Mr. Norris can demonstrate his
own "cognizable injury in fact," even if his own conduct is not protected. Id. at 739.
This requirement is satisfied because Mr. Norris participated "in a course of conduct
arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by statute, and there exists
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a credible threat of prosecution/' Id (quotation and citation omitted). Mr. Norris can also
easily meet the second requirement for standing by showing that if this Court invalidates
the statute, his harm will be redressed, as there can be no doubt that Mr. Norris has a
"personal stake in the outcome of the controversy/* Id. (citing Bigelow v Virginia, 421
U.S. 809,816-17(1975)).
Moreover, in Thompson, this Court cited Midvale City Corp. v. Haltom, 2003
UT 26, P10, 73 P.3d 334, as authoritative in determining whether a party can demonstrate
their own cognizable injury in fact in the context of a facial overbreadth challenge. In
Haltom, this Court determined that because the selling of sexual devices is not speech, as
such products express nothing, the party (Haltom) who challenged a statute adversely
affecting his ability to engage in such conduct as facially overbroad under the First
Amendment had no standing. Id. The selling of sexual devices was not a course of
conduct affected with a constitutional interest under the First Amendment, and therefore,
Haltom had no stake in the outcome of the controversy.
This case is inapposite to Haltom. Here, the conduct at issue is speech for
purposes of the First Amendment, and therefore, clearly fails under its protective
provisions. Regardless of whether Mr. Norris' own conduct is or is not protected under
the First Amendment, his alleged course of conduct (making a false communication)
affected a constitutional interest, was proscribed by statute, and certainly posed a realized
threat of prosecution. Furthermore, Mr. Norris obviously has a personal stake in the
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outcome of this controversy.
Based on the foregoing facts and law. Mr. Norris has standing to challenge Utah
Code Ann. §76-10-1801 for facial overbreadth, and the State's arguments are without
merit.
C

A CHALLENGE TO A STATUTE'S OVERBREADTH
ENCOMPASSES A CHALLENGE THAT THE STATUTE IS VOID
FOR VAGUENESS.

This Court expressly granted certiorari on the issue of overbreadth. It was not
Mr, Norris' intent to exceed the scope of certiorari, and he does not believe he has done
so. Because the concepts of overbreadth and vagueness are logically related and
overlapping doctrines, Mr. Norris treated them as such in his opening brief See, BRIEF
OF APPELLANT at 31 ("See, Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 n.8 (1983) ('We have
traditionally viewed vagueness and overbreadth as logically related and similar
doctrines.'); see also, Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional
Law §§20.9 at 274 (3 ed. 1999) ('The problem of vagueness in statutes regulating speech
activities is based on the same rationale as the overbreadth doctrine and the Supreme
Court often speaks of them together').
In short, the overly broad provisions of §76-10-1801 are so far-reaching in their
scope, that they fail to define the offense such that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited, thereby encouraging arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 927 (Utah App. 1991). In other words, the overly
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broad language makes the statute void for vagueness. As has already been argued herein,
the statute provides virtually unlimited prosecutorial discretion in determining which
conduct to prosecute and which cases to decline - in other words, it encourages arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement. Unfettered prosecutorial discretion is the flaw inherent
in any criminal statute that is overbroad, as well as a statute that is vague.
Traditionally, the void for vagueness doctrine has focused upon the issue of
notice - whether a statute defines an offense such "that ordinary people can understand
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement." Ko lender v. Law son, 461 U.S. at 357-358. However,
although the doctrines of overbreadth and void for vagueness may have some nonsubstantive differences, the "more important" element of the void for vagueness doctrine
is identical to that of the overbreadth doctrine: ". . . that a legislature establish minimal
guidelines to govern law enforcement. . . . [thereby avoiding] a standardless sweep that
allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections. .. It
would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all
possible offenders . . . " Id. Thus, the overbreadth and void for vagueness doctrines are
inseparably intertwined.
Accordingly, Mr. Norris believes in good faith that this Court's grant of
certiorari on the issue of overbreadth encompasses the issue of vagueness, and that this
Court intends to consider both related doctrines relative to this matter.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing facts and law, Appellant, Richard Morris, respectfully
requests this Court to reverse the Utah Court of Appeals and thereby vacate his
convictions on the grounds that §76-10-1801 is unconstitutional on its face.

20

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20040880-SC
vs.
RICHARD NORRIS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF CROSS-RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is properly before this Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of
Appeals from its decision in State v. Norris, 2004 UT App. 267, 97 P.3d 732. This Court
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(5).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Does a statutory constitutional defect deprive the trial court of jurisdiction?
Standard of Review: On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the Utah
Court of Appeals, adopting the same standard of review and reviewing questions of law
for correctness and factual findings for clear error. State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1199.
Questions regarding the scope of judicial authority are questions of law. Beaver County
v. Qwest, Inc., 31 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2001).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A guilty plea does not waive an appellant's right to challenge the subject matter
jurisdiction of the trial court. By express provision in the Utah Code, a court does not
have jurisdiction over a matter excepted by the State constitution or otherwise prohibited
by law. If a criminal statute is unconstitutional, it is excepted by the constitution and
prohibited by law. Because the communications fraud statute is unconstitutional on its
face for overbreadth, it is prohibited by law and, therefore, the trial court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over this matter.
Further, this Court has never directly addressed this issue before. However, a
substantial body of federal precedent holds that a challenge to a statute's constitutionality
is a challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court, and is therefore not
waived by an unconditional guilty plea.
If a person is convicted under an unconstitutional criminal provision, either by
trial or plea, it is a violation of that person's right to due process of law. This is true
because, under existing constitutional law. the government lacked the power from the
outset to hale the person into court and answer the charges. Therefore, an
unconstitutional statute deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.
ARGUMENT
I.

A CHALLENGE TO A STATUTE'S CONSTITUTIONALITY IS
JURISDICTIONAL IN NATURE.
A guilty plea does not waive an appellant's right to challenge his convictions on
22

grounds alleging jurisdictional defects. United States v. Harper, 901 F.2d 471, 472 (5th
Cir. 1990); see also, United States v. Rivera, 879 F.2d 1247, 1251 (5th Cir. 1989)
(explaining that a guilty plea is no bar to a challenge on jurisdictional grounds).
Moreover, federal courts have determined that a statute's unconstitutional vagueness is a
jurisdictional defect. United States v. Skinner, 25 F.3d 1314, 1317 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing
Blacldedge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (holding that a defendant can challenge the
constitutionality of a statute after entering a guilty plea)).
If a statute under which a defendant is charged is unconstitutionally overbroad, it
follows that the Information may not even charge a crime or is constitutionally defective.
United States v„ Harper, 901 F.2d at 473 ("A criminal indictment 'must be a plain,
concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
charged.'"(emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Morales-Rosales, 838 F.2d
1359, 1361 (5th Cir. 1988)). "An [Information] that fails to allege each material element
of an offense fails to charge that offense." Id. But see, United States v. Allen, 24 F.3d
1180, 1183 (10th Cir. 1994) (explaining that a defendant who makes a counseled and
voluntary guilty plea admits both the acts described in the indictment and the legal
consequences of those acts, and therefore any challenges on appeal are foreclosed by
admissions made during the plea colloquy).
In this case, Mr. Norris challenges the constitutionality of the communications
fraud statute and thus the sufficiency of the Information filed against him, both of which
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have been determined by federal courts to be non-waivable jurisdictional issues as
referenced in the cases cited above. Moreover, if a statute cannot pass constitutional
scrutiny, it follows that a trial court has no subject matter jurisdiction over any charge
brought under that statute. Accordingly, Mr. Norris may appeal his convictions in this
case notwithstanding his guilty pleas.
Further, Mr. Norris did not waive his right to appeal the statute's
constitutionality and thus the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court when he did not
file a motion to withdraw his pleas. To preserve for appeal the challenge to a trial court's
compliance with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, an appellant must first
file a motion to withdraw his plea within 30 days after sentencing. State v. Reyes, 40 P.3d
630 (Utah 2002). However, in this case, the issue before this Court is not the trial court's
compliance with Rule 11 but the constitutionality of the communications fraud statute,
and thus the sufficiency of the Information apprising Mr. Norris of the charges, which
issues are direct challenges to the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court.
Accordingly, Mr. Norris may appeal his convictions on the grounds that §76-10-1801 is
unconstitutional and therefore the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
The State claims that Mr. Norris waived his right to appeal the constitutionality
of Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 when he pleaded guilty in this case. The State further
cites State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989) which provides that a defendant who
pleads guilty "waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre~plea
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constitutional violations." Id. at 1278 (emphasis added). The State also concedes that a
defendant is not precluded from challenging the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction.
Not only is the State's position flawed, but it is inconsistent with the very authority it
cites.
Although it does not appear that this issue has been directly addressed in Utah
appellate courts, the rationale underlying the wise and widely adopted principle that an
unconstitutional law deprives a court of jurisdiction is supported by Utah Code Ann. §783-4(1), which bestows jurisdiction upon the district courts "in all matters . . . not excepted
in the [state] Constitution and not prohibited by law" (emphasis added). A statute that is
unconstitutional is, by definition, excepted by the Constitution and prohibited by law, and
therefore, raises a valid challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the district courts.
The issue is not, as the State argues, dependant on the fact that criminal statutes
are presumed constitutional from the outset. If the legislature unwisely makes it a crime
to yell "Fire!" in all circumstances, a person who violates the statute and consequently
saves many lives by doing so may plead guilty to the offense, because in fact he is guilty.
However, just because the unwise and facially invalid criminal provision is presumed
constitutional from the outset does not mean the conviction should stand, or that the
defendant should be precluded from challenging his conviction. Nor would an outcome
favorable to Mr. Norris in this case require district courts to sua sponte consider the
constitutionality of every criminal statute under which charges are brought. There is also
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no justification for the claim that criminal matters would remain perpetually unresolved.
Rather, the issue is simply whether a challenge to the constitutionality of a
statute is jurisdictional in nature. Logic compels the conclusion that it is. Therefore, it
cannot be waived by a guilty plea. A claim that a law is invalid challenges the subject
matter jurisdiction of the trial court because such a claim asserts, "The State had no power
to charge me with this crime because the statute upon which the State relies violates
constitutional law. Therefore, the State had no power to hale me into court and force me
to answer to these charges." If a statute violates constitutional law, the claim of
unconstitutionality is valid regardless of when it is raised.
Federal courts have adopted this position, and have further clarified identical
principles already adopted and relied upon, if not yet fully addressed, by this Court.
Using language strikingly similar to that set forth in Parsons above, the Ninth Circuit
Court clarified the distinction between "pre-plea constitutional violations" and
"jurisdictional claims": "Although a guilty plea generally waives all claims of
constitutional violation occurring before the plea, 'jurisdictional' claims are an exception
to this rule," United States v. Caperell, 938 F.2d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting United
States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1989), amended at 907 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1990)).
Moreover, "claims that the applicable statute is unconstitutional or that the indictment
fails to state an offense are jurisdictional claims not waived by the guilty plea." United
States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d at 552 (quoting United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260,
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1261 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1979). cert denied, 444 U.S. 859 (1979)). Thus, a guilty plea waives
pre-plea constitutional non-jurisdictional violations, such as an unlawful search and
seizure, but not constitutional claims that by their nature, divest the trial court of
jurisdiction over the matter.
Several other courts have consistently followed this same sound reasoning, and
in many of these cases, the United States Supreme Court declined to review. See, United
States v. Rivera, 879 F.2d 1247, 1251 (5th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 998 (1989);
United States v. Skinner, 25 F.3d 1314 (6th Cir. 1994); O'Learyv. United States, 856 F.2d
1142, 1143 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. DiFonzo, 603 F.2d 1260, 1263 (7th Cir.
1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1018 (1980). Mr. Norris urges this Court to follow this
precedent and hold that a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is a challenge to
the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court.
The State argues that this Court's decision in Myers v. State, 94 P.3d 211 (Utah
2004), defeats the Utah Court of Appeals holding that a constitutional defect divests the
trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. However, the State's interpretation of Myers is
inaccurate. In Myers, after determining that the defendant's claims were procedurally
barred, this Court briefly addressed Myers' then moot claim that the trial court's
conclusion that a fetus is a "person" in the context of the aggravated murder statute was
unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Myers contended that a fetus
could not be construed as a "person" in the context of the aggravated murder statute
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without violating Roe v Wade. This Court responded:
w

Tn considering Myers's motion, the trial court determined that a fetus was a
'person' for purposes of the aggravated murder statute, and, therefore, the State
appropriately prosecuted Myers under that statute. 'A judgment is not void
merely because it is erroneous,9 and '[a] judgment incorrectly interpreting a rule
of law does not divest the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
proceeding.' (quoting In re Estate of McLaughlin, ISA P.2d 679, 682 (Utah
App. 1988)). At most, Myers is claiming that the trial court's decision
constituted an 'erroneous application of the law" See id. To hold that a court is
divested of subject matter jurisdiction because of an allegedly incorrect legal
interpretation borders on the nonsensical and would allow a substantial
circumvention of the present framework with respect to post-conviction claims."
Myers v. State, 94 P.3d at 215-16 (emphasis added). Therefore, this Court did not directly
address the question of whether a statute's unconstitutionality deprives a trial court of
jurisdiction.
As Judge Orme noted in his concurring opinion in Norris, this "Court's
dismissal of the jurisdictional argument in Myers was premised on the simplistic notion
that c[a] court has subject matter jurisdiction if the case is one of the type of cases the
court has been empowered to entertain by the constitution or statute from which the court
derives its authority.' . . . The Myers opinion did not acknowledge, much less did it treat,
the extensive state and federal jurisprudence categorizing the facial unconstitutionality of
a criminal statute as being a matter of subject matter jurisdiction - a virtual impossibility
if the argument had actually been made and was well-supported, as in the instant case."
State v. Norris, 97 P.3d at n2(citation omitted).
In contrast to Myers, Mr. Norris is not arguing that the trial court erroneously
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applied the law. He is arguing that the underlying statute is unconstitutional. And if the
statute is unconstitutional it is by definition, excepted by the State and federal
constitutions and, therefore, prohibited by law. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3-4(1).
The State criticizes the Utah Court of Appeals' reliance on Blackledge v. Perry,
417 U.S. 21 (1974), and Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975), arguing that these cases
do no support the court's holding that an unconstitutional statute is a jurisdictional defect.
However, both of those cases directly support Mr. Norris' position, as they stand for the
proposition that a constitutional defect deprives the State of the power to bring charges
against a defendant from the outset. Logically, this is true whether the constitutional
defect is a due process violation, double jeopardy, or an overly broad statute. As all are
constitutional violations, it does not matter which provision of the constitution is violated.
Moreover, the Due Process Clause contained in the Fifth Amendment to the
federal constitution proves problematic when the government obtains a conviction under
an unconstitutional statute, or via the unconstitutional application of a statute. The
practical effect of the Due Process Clause in such a circumstance is to simply deprive the
trial court of jurisdiction from the outset and invalidate the conviction.
For example, in Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), a defendant residing in
North Carolina pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor and was then subsequently convicted by
a jury of a felony offense for the same conduct, in violation of prohibitions against double
jeopardy. The high court stated that because of the constitutional violations inherent in
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the second prosecution, "the very initiation of the proceedings against [the defendant] . . .
thus operated to deny him due process of law. . . . The 'practical result' dictated by the
Due Process Clause in this case is that North Carolina simply could not require Perry [the
defendant] to answer to the felony charge." Id. at 30-31.
The ultimate result in Blackledge v. Perry would have been no different if Perry
had pleaded guilty to the charges in the second prosecution, because the constitutional
violations, and thus the due process deprivations, are identical in both circumstances. In
either scenario, the district court ultimately lacked jurisdiction over the unconstitutional
prosecution and conviction of the second case. Yet if the State's arguments in this case
were adopted, a defendant who pleaded guilty twice to the same offense would be
precluded from challenging the second conviction under the procedural facts of this case.
The State urges this Court to follow the Nebraska Supreme Court in State v.
Thomas, 685 N.W.2d 69 (Neb. 2004). It is noteworthy that this is one of only two cases4
(to counsel's best knowledge) directly contraiy to Mr. Norris' position and the substantial
federal precedent cited above. Notwithstanding that the Nebraska court, while acknow-
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The State also references United States v. Baucum, 80 F.3d 539 (D.C. Cir.), cert
denied, 519 U.S. 879 (1996), wherein that court also rejected arguments that a facial
constitutional challenge to a presumptively valid statute divests a court of subject matter
jurisdiction. However, while again acknowledging precedent on both sides of this issue,
and further declining to hold that federal appellate courts may not ever consider
constitutional challenges raised for the first time on appeal, it also noted as persuasive the
fact that the statute at issue in that case did not involve the state's power to hale a
defendant into court, but rather merely involved the increase of a penalty. Id. at 542-43.
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ledging precedent on both sides of the issue, appears to be in the minority, the appellant in
that case was seeking at least a second bite of the proverbial apple. Thomas raised, for
the first time, his claim that the statute's alleged unconstitutionality deprived the trial
court of subject matter jurisdiction on his second appeal after remand. In this posture, the
appellate court determined that Thomas' claim that the charging statute was unconstitutional did not divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction and that he waived it by
failing to preserve the issue via a motion to quash in the district court. Id at 84.
In sum, a challenge to a statute's constitutionality is jurisdictional in nature and
is, therefore, not waived by a guilty plea. Accordingly, Mr. Norris's guilty pleas in this
case do not preclude him from raising his constitutional challenges on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Mr Norris respectfully requests this Court to affirm
the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals that a challenge to the facial overbreadth of a
statute is jurisdictional in nature, and is therefore not waived by a guilty plea.
Respectfully submitted this
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